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Abstract
We present a general information-theoretic argument that all ecient communica-
tion systems will be ambiguous, assuming that context is informative about mean-
ing. We also argue that ambiguity additionally allows for greater ease of processing
by allowing ecient linguistic units to be re-used. We test predictions of this theory
in English, German, and Dutch. Our results and theoretical analysis suggest that
ambiguity is a functional property of language that allows for greater communica-
tive eciency. This provides theoretical and empirical arguments against recent
suggestions that core features of linguistic systems are not designed for communi-
cation.
Introduction
Ambiguity is a pervasive phenomenon in language which occurs at all levels of linguis-
tic analysis. Out of context, words have multiple senses and syntactic categories, requiring
listeners to determine which meaning and part of speech was intended. Morphemes may
also be ambiguous out of context, as in the English  s, which can denote either a plural
noun marking (trees), a possessive (Dylan's), or a present tense verb conjugation (runs).
Phonological forms are often mapped to multiple distinct word meanings, as in the homo-
phones too, two, and to. Syllables are almost always ambiguous in isolation, meaning that
they can be interpreted as providing incomplete information about the word the speaker
is intending to communicate. Syntactic and semantic ambiguity are frequent enough to
present a substantial challenge to natural language processing. The fact that ambiguity oc-
curs on so many linguistic levels suggests that a far-reaching principle is needed to explain
its origins and persistence.
The existence of ambiguity provides a puzzle for functionalist theories which attempt
to explain properties of linguistic systems in terms of communicative pressures (e.g. Hock-
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ett, 1960; Pinker & Bloom, 1990). One might imagine that in a perfect communication
system, language would completely disambiguate meaning. Each linguistic form would
map bijectively to a meaning, and comprehenders would not need to expend eort infer-
ring what the speaker intended to say. This would reduce the computational diculties in
language understanding and comprehension because recovering meaning would be no more
complex than, for instance, compiling a computer program. The communicative ecacy of
language might be enhanced since there would be no danger of comprehenders incorrectly
inferring the intended meaning. Confusion about \who's on rst" could not occur.
Indeed, the existence of ambiguity in language has been argued to show that the key
structures and properties of language have not evolved for purposes of communication or
use:
The natural approach has always been: Is it well designed for use, understood
typically as use for communication? I think that's the wrong question. The use
of language for communication might turn out to be a kind of epiphenomenon.
... If you want to make sure that we never misunderstand one another, for
that purpose language is not well designed, because you have such properties
as ambiguity. If we want to have the property that the things that we usually
would like to say come out short and simple, well, it probably doesn't have that
property. (Chomsky, 2002, p107)
Here, we argue that this perspective on ambiguity is exactly backwards. We argue, contrary
to the Chomskyan view, that ambiguity is in fact a desirable property of communication
systems, precisely because it allows for a communication system which is \short and simple."
We argue for two benecial properties of ambiguity: rst, where context is informative
about meaning, unambiguous language is partly redundant with the context and therefore
inecient; and second, ambiguity allows the re-use of words and sounds which are more
easily produced or understood. Our approach follows directly from the hypothesis that
language approximates an optimal code for human communication, following a tradition
of research spearheaded by Zipf which has recently come back into favor to explain both
the online behavior of language users (e.g. Genzel & Charniak, 2002; Aylett & Turk, 2004;
Jaeger, 2006; Levy & Jaeger, 2007, i.a.) and the structure of languages themselves (e.g.
Ferrer i Cancho & Sole, 2003; Ferrer i Cancho, 2006; Piantadosi, Tily, & Gibson, 2011). In
fact, our specic hypothesis is closely related to a theory initially suggested by Zipf (1949).
In Zipf's view, ambiguity ts within the framework of his grand unifying principle of
least eort and could be understood by considering the competing desires of the speaker
and the listener. The speaker can minimize their eort if all meanings are expressed by one
simple, maximally ambiguous word, say, ba. To express a meaning such as \The accordion
box is too small," the speaker would simply say ba. To say \It will rain next Wednesday,"
the speaker would say ba. Such a system is very easy for speakers since they do not need
to expend any eort thinking about or searching memory to retrieve the correct linguistic
form to produce. Conversely, from the comprehender's perspective, eort is minimized if
each meaning maps to a distinct linguistic form, assuming that handling many distinct word
forms is not overly dicult for comprehenders. In that type of system, the listener does not
need to expend eort inferring what the speaker intended, since the linguistic signal would
leave only one possibility.
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Zipf suggested that natural language would strike a balance between these two op-
posing forces of unication and diversication, arriving at a middle ground with some but
not total, ambiguity. Zipf argued this balance of speakers' and comprehenders' interests
will be observed in a balance between frequency of words and number of words: speakers
want a single (therefore highly frequent) word, and comprehenders want many (therefore
less frequent) words. He suggested the balancing of these two forces could be observed
in the relationship between word frequency and rank frequency: the vocabulary was \bal-
anced" because a word's frequency multiplied by its frequency rank was roughly a constant,
a celebrated statistical law of language1. Ferrer i Cancho and Sole (2003) provide a formal
backing to Zipf's intuitive explanation, showing that the power law distribution arises when
information-theoretic diculty for speakers and comprehenders is appropriately balanced.
Zipf (1949) further extends his thinking to the distribution of word meanings by testing
a quantitative relationship between word frequency and number of meanings. He derives
a law of meaning distribution from his posited forces of unication and diversication, ar-
guing that the number of meanings a word has should scale with the square root of its
frequency. Zipf reports a very close empirical t for this prediction. Functionalist linguistic
theories have also posited trade-os between total ambiguity and perfect and unambiguous
logical communication (e.g. Givon, 2009), although to our knowledge these have not been
evaluated empirically.
Zipf's statement of the way ambiguity might arise as a trade-o between speaker
and hearer pressures has certain shortcomings. As pointed out by Wasow, Perfors, and
Beaver (2005), it is unlikely that a speaker's eort is minimized by a totally ambiguous
language, since confusion means that the speaker may need to expend eort clarifying what
was intended. We show below that ambiguity is benecial in exactly those situations where
no additional clarication is required. Second, Zipf's argument required the hypothetical
forces of unication and diversication. Our argument shows how the utility of ambiguity
can be derived without positing that speakers want to produce one single concise word, or
that comprehenders want a completely unambiguous system. We argue that Zipf's basic
intuition about ambiguity|that it results from a rational process of communication|is
fundamentally correct. Instead of unication and diversication, we argue that ambiguity
can be understood by the trade-o between two communicative pressures which are inherent
to any communicative system: clarity and ease. A clear communication system is one in
which the intended meaning can be recovered from the signal with high probability. An
easy communication system is one which signals are eciently produced, communicated,
and processed. There are many factors which likely determine ease for human language:
for instance, words which are easy to process are likely short, frequent, and phonotactically
well-formed. Clarity and ease are opposed because there are a limited number of \easy"
signals which can be used. This means that in order to assign meanings unambiguously or
clearly, one must use words which are more dicult.
One example that illustrates this trade-o is the NATO phonetic alphabet. The
NATO phonetic alphabet is the system of naming letters which is used by the military and
pilots|A is \Alpha", B is \Bravo", C is \Charlie", etc. This system was created to avoid
the confusion that might occur when one attempts to communicate similar-sounding letter
1See also Manin (2008), who derives the Zipan distribution of word meanings by positing that languages
evolve to avoid excessive synonymy.
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names across a noisy acoustic channel. The way this was done was by changing letters to
full words, adding redundant information so that a listener can recognize the correct letter
in the presence of noise. The downside is that instead of letters having relatively short
names, they have mostly bisyllabic full-word names|which take more time and eort to
produce and comprehend|trading ease for clarity. Trade-os in the other direction are
also common in language: pronouns, for instance, allow speakers to refer to locally salient
discourse entities in a concise way. They are ambiguous because they could potentially refer
to anyone, but allow for greater ease of communication by being short and frequent, and
potentially less dicult for syntactic systems (Marslen-Wilson, Levy, & Tyler, 1982; Ariel,
1990; Gundel, Hedberg, & Zacharski, 1993; Warren & Gibson, 2002; Arnold, 2008; Tily &
Piantadosi, 2009).
Our approach complements previous work arguing that ambiguity is rarely harmful
to communication in practice thanks to the comprehender's ability to eectively disam-
biguate between possible meanings (Wasow & Arnold, 2003; Wasow et al., 2005; Jaeger,
2006; Roland, Elman, & Ferreira, 2006; Ferreira, 2008; Jaeger, 2010). Additionally, several
authors have previously discussed the possibility that ambiguity is a useful feature of lan-
guage. Several cognitive explanations of ambiguity were discussed by Wasow et al. (2005).
One is the possibility that ambiguity reduces the memory demands of storing a lexicon,
though they conclude that human memory is probably not a bottleneck in vocabulary size.
They also hypothesize that there may be some processing constraint against longer mor-
phemes which leads to shorter morphemes being recycled for multiple meanings. This is
one case of the theory we present and test in the next section: that forms are re-used when
they are easy to process. Wasow et al. (2005) also suggest ambiguity might be useful in
language contact situations, where speakers of both languages should ideally be able to
handle words meaning two dierent things in two dierent situations. They also point out
that ambiguity does sometimes serve a communicative function when speakers wish to be
ambiguous intentionally, giving the example of a dinner guest who says \Nothing is better
than your cooking" to express a compliment and an insult simultaneously. Neither of these
arguments are especially compelling because it is unclear how they could explain the fact
that linguistic ambiguity is so common.
Ambiguity has also been considered previously in the context of mathematical models
of communication, as a capacity that may allow language to stay in a preferable portion of
the model's parameter space Ferrer i Cancho (2006), or as a necessary factor in the devel-
opment of a combinatorial communication system (Ferrer i Cancho & Loreto, in prep). In
particular, Ferrer i Cancho and Loreto (in prep) discuss that combining linguistic units pro-
vides no advantage when each linguistic unit unambiguously communicates a full meaning,
indicating that the compositional, combinatorial nature of language is intrinsically linked
with the property that individual linguistic units (e.g. words) do not completely disam-
biguate a speaker's intended meaning. However, their analysis does not go so far as to say
that entire combinatorial linguistic utterances should still be ambiguous, as we nd with
semantic or syntactic ambiguities that can only be resolved using contextual information.
An information-theoretic approach to ambiguity was pursued by Juba, Kalai, Khanna,
and Sudan (2011), who argue that ambiguity allows for more ecient compression when
speakers and listeners have boundedly dierent prior distributions on meanings. This com-
plements the information-theoretic analysis we present in the next section, although study-
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ing boundedly dierent priors requires a considerably more complex analysis.
The goal of the present paper is to develop an explanation for ambiguity which makes
fewer assumptions than previous work, and is more generally applicable. Indeed, the expla-
nations we present demonstrate that ambiguity is a desirable feature of any communicative
system when context is informative about meaning. We argue that the generality of our
results explains the pervasiveness of ambiguity in language, and shows how ambiguity likely
results from ubiquitous pressure for ecient communication.
Two benets of ambiguity
In this section we argue that ecient communication systems will be ambiguous
when context is informative about what is being communicated. We present two similar
perspectives on this point. The rst shows that the most ecient communication system
will not convey information already provided by the context. Such communication systems
necessarily appear to be ambiguous when examined out of context. Second, we argue that
specically for the human language processing mechanisms, ambiguity additionally allows
re-use of \easy" linguistic elements|words that are short, frequent, and phonotactically
high probability.
Both these perspectives assume that disambiguation is not prohibitively costly (see
Levinson, 2000)|that using information from the context to infer which meaning was in-
tended does not substantially impede comprehension. We return to this issue in the discus-
sion. We note here that our explanations for ambiguity do not prove ambiguity necessarily
makes language more ecient. One could always construct an ambiguous linguistic system
which was not ecient|for instance, one which leaves out information other than what is
provided in the context, or re-uses particularly dicult linguistic elements. Instead, these
benets of ambiguity suggest that any system which strives for communicative or cognitive
eciency will naturally be ambiguous: ambiguity is not a puzzle for communicative theories
of language.
Ambiguity in general communication
In this section, we motivate an information-theoretic view of ambiguity. We will
assume that there exists a set M of possible meanings. For generality, we will allow M to
range over any possible set of meanings. For instance,M might be the space of compositional
semantic structures, the space of parse trees, or the set of word senses. The argument in
this section is general to any space of meaning.
Intuitively, a linguistic form is ambiguous if it can map to more than one possible
meaning. For instance, the word \run" is ambiguous because it can map to a large number of
possible meanings, including a run in a pantyhose, a run in baseball, a jog, to run, a stretch of
consecutive events, etc. It turns out, however, that we do not need to consider the ambiguity
of specic words or linguistic units to argue that ambiguity is in general useful. This is
because language can fundamentally be viewed as conveying bits of information about the
speaker's intended meaning. By formalizing a notion of uncertainty about meaning, one
can show that the optimally ecient communication system will look ambiguous, as long
as context is informative about meaning.
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We quantify the uncertainty that listeners would have about intended meaning by
using Shannon entropy2. Shannon entropy measures the amount of information required
on average to disambiguate which meaning in M is intended and is given by
H [M ] =  
X
m2M
P (m) logP (m); (1)
where P (m) is the probability that meaning m is the intended meaning. Shannon entropy
quanties information on a scale of bits. When P (m) = 1 for some m, no information about
the meaning needs to be transmitted (since the intended meaning can always be guessed
correctly without any communication) so the entropy is 0. Conversely, when the entropy is
high, more bits of information are needed to disambiguate which of the possible meanings
was intended. If we consider only two possible meanings, there is maximal uncertainty when
both meanings are equally likely. In this case, we need exactly one bit of information to
disambiguate which meaning was intended. This can be checked by plugging in P (m1) =
P (m2) =
1
2 into equation 1 above, to get 1 bit of uncertainty
3. When one meaning is much
more frequent than other, it requires less than less than 1 bit of information on average to
disambiguate.
The notion of ambiguity in Equation 1 does not take into account context|only the
listener's a-priori uncertainty about intended meaning. However, actual language use takes
place with reference to world and linguistic context. Knowing that the speaker is playing
baseball, for instance, will change the expectations of what meaning of \run" is intended.
This means that the probability distribution P (m) may depend on context, and therefore
the Shannon entropy does as well. For convenience we will wrap all extra-linguistic factors,
including discourse context, world context, world knowledge, etc. into a variable C, for \the
context." We can then include C into the information-theoretic framework by measuring
the entropy of M , conditioned on C:
H [M j C] =  
X
c2C
P (c)
X
m2M
P (m j c) logP (m j c): (2)
Here, the rightmost sum is simply the entropy over meanings in the particular context
c 2 C. This part of the equation is the same as Equation (1), except that P (m) has been
replaced by the probability ofm in context c, denoted P (m j c). This entropy is weighted by
a distribution P (c) on contexts, meaning that H [M j C] can be interpreted as the expected
entropy over meanings, in context.
While these equations provide ways to theoretically compute the entropy or ambiguity
left by a linguistic element, what is more important is the relationship between these two
entropy measures. In particular, if C is informative about meaning, then it is provably true
(see Cover & Thomas, 2006, p20-30) that
H [M ] > H [M j C] : (3)
In other words, when the context C is known and informative, it necessarily decreases the
entropy. The strictness of this inequality comes from the fact that context provides some
2See Cover and Thomas (2006) for a mathematical overview of information theory, and MacKay (2003)
for a technical introduction.
3For log base 2
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information about meaning. As an example, listeners may have uncertainty about whether
a word like \run" is intended to be a noun or a verb. Out of context, it may be somewhat
dicult to guess, and so the word \run" is highly ambiguous out of context. In context,
however, it is often clear: syntactic information, as well as discourse context, provide a
considerable amount of meaning about which \run" is intended. For instance, \a run"
typically disambiguates \run" to a noun, but \we run" typically disambiguates to a verb.
Equation 3 states that on average it must be the case that the meanings can be conveyed
with fewer bits of information when context is taken into account.
An optimally ecient communication system will attempt to be as ecient as pos-
sible, meaning that it will not convey unnecessary information. Since language use occurs
in contexts C, the least amount of information that language can convey without being
ambiguous in context is H [M j C]. Because Equation 3 is a strict inequality, the amount
of information ecient language should convey will always be less than the entropy out of
context, H [M ]. Shannon's source coding theorem (Shannon, 1948) showed, in part, that it
would be impossible to disambiguate H [M ] bits of uncertainty with fewer than H [M ] bits
of information without making errors. This means that no matter whatH [M j C] bits of in-
formation the linguistic system communicates, it will never be able to remove H [M ] bits of
uncertainty: an ecient communication system will never be able to disambiguate language
out of context. This means that when the individual units of an ecient communication
system are viewed outside of their typical contexts, they will look ambiguous.
Note that this argument is very general in that we made no assumptions about the
linguistic system, or the distribution of contexts or meanings. Additionally, we did not even
make assumptions about what the contexts or meanings actually were: the argument is
general enough to apply to all situations in which context is informative about meaning,
whatever context and meaning happen to be, and therefore applies to all levels of linguistic
analysis. A key assumption that is required is that speakers and listeners have the same|
or very similar|coding schemes (corresponding to similar probabilistic models of language
and the world), and also the same ability to use contextual information to constrain the
possible meanings.
Ambiguity and minimum eort
Here, we present a second argument that ambiguity is a desirable property of a lin-
guistic system because it potentially allows for greater overall ease of processing. The results
in this section extends the information-theoretic proof above to the case where code words
(e.g. phonological forms) vary in their diculty for language processing systems. The argu-
ment is similar in spirit to Zipf (1949)'s proposal described in the introduction which held
that ambiguity can result from trading o ease of production and ease of comprehension.
Our proposal diers in how \ease" is quantied, and is general enough to potentially in-
clude Zipf's ideas, as well as other properties of language which have been found to aect
processing diculty. This point does not necessarily entail that languages do use ambiguity
in this ecient way; in the next section, we establish with corpus studies that they do.
Suppose that L is a set of linguistic units|for instance, words. Each element of L
varies in its diculty for the comprehension and production mechanisms: short words are
easier, phonotactically well-formed words are easier, frequent words are easier, etc. Each
possible meaning in M is mapped to a linguistic unit in L. Ambiguity allows multiple
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meanings m1;m2 2 M to be mapped to the same linguistic unit l 2 L; conversely, an
unambiguous linguistic system would map only one meaning to each element of L. As above,
the proof that ambiguity is desirable in this setup will assume that context is informative
about meaning, and disambiguation is not prohibitively costly. Here, it will be most useful to
consider that some meanings m1 and m2 which are well-enough disambiguated by context
that they can both be assigned to the same lexical item without signicant chance of
confusion. This is likely the case with many word-sense ambiguities, for instance a run in
pantyhose and a run in baseball.
In an unambiguous linguistic system, m1 is mapped to l1 2 L and m2 is mapped
to l2 2 L, with l1 6= l2. Suppose that l1 is easier than l2 according to any metric of
eort|length, phonotactic well-formedness, neighborhood size, frequency, broader memory
considerations, or some overall combination of these. If l1 is easier than l2, and m1 and m2
are well-disambiguated by context, then we can always create a linguistic system which is
easier overall by mapping m1 and m2 both to l1. This costs the same in terms of eort
every time we communicate m1, but saves eort every time we communicate m2, relative to
the unambiguous system, since l1 is less eort than l2. Of course, in real language there are
likely many pairs or tuples of meanings which can be assigned to the same linguist forms.
This argument is meant to simplify and show that as long as there are at least two meanings
which are unlikely to occur in the same contexts, the linguistic system can be improved by
introducing ambiguity.
This shows that under very weak conditions, an unambiguous linguistic system can
always be made easier to use by preferentially re-using the \easy" linguistic units. Un-
like the information-theoretic argument, this argument assumes specic details about the
linguistic elements which are being communicated|some involve less eort than others. Ad-
ditionally, this argument requires the assumption that disambiguation is not prohibitively
costly|otherwise a language with ambiguity would not be \easier." We nd this plausible
because many dierent meanings occur in largely non-overlapping contexts (for instance, in
syntactic category ambiguity). In addition, the inference involved in disambiguation does
not appear to be especially costly. In many if not all communicative situations, speakers
easily infer a rich set of pragmatic and social consequences of language use. Levinson (e.g.
Levinson, 2000) has argued extensively that in all aspects of communication, much of the
speaker's intent is not explicitly coded in language but inferred through the hearer's knowl-
edge of likely intentions, conventions of interaction, and common sense knowledge about
the world. Like Zipf, Levinson assumes that this situation results from a trade-o between
hearer and speaker pressures, and moreover argues that human cognitive abilities will favor
communication systems which are heavy on hearer inference and light on speaker eort.
The essential asymmetry is: inference is cheap, articulation expensive, and thus
the design requirements are for a system that maximizes inference. (Hence ...
linguistic coding is is to be thought of less like denitive content and more like
interpretive clue.) (Levinson, 2000, p29)
Our theory relies on exactly this point: hearers are good at disambiguating in context, and
therefore any eort the speaker makes to express a distinction that could have been inferred
is wasted eort.
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Empirical evaluation of ambiguity and eort
In the previous section, we presented two closely related arguments that ambiguity
allows for more ecient communication systems. Both assumed that information is typi-
cally present to resolve ambiguities, and that using this information is relatively \cheap."
The rst argument looked at ambiguity from the perspective of coding theory, arguing that
when context is informative, any good communication system will leave out information
already in the context. The second assumed that codewords dier in their diculty, and
argued that as long as there are some ambiguities that context can resolve, ecient commu-
nication systems will use ambiguity to make communication easier. We do not view these
arguments as distinct alternatives, but rather as two complementary ways of understanding
how ambiguity is useful. It is unclear how one might test the rst, information-theoretic
argument, since it is a mathematical demonstration that ambiguity should exist; it does
not make predictions about language other than the presence of ambiguity. The second
account, however, directly predicts that linguistic units which require \less eort" should
be more ambiguous. This would be a hallmark of an ecient communication system, one
which has harnessed ambiguity as a core functional component of language.
One simple and intuitive measure of eort is word frequency: words which are used
more often are generally processed more quickly than infrequent words. Indeed, previous
results such as Reder, Anderson, and Bjork (1974) and (Zipf, 1949, p30) have found rela-
tionships between frequency and the amount of ambiguity in a word. However, frequency is
correlated with other measures|most notably length|and is confounded since words with
more meanings should be useful in more contexts, and thus be used more frequently. To
our knowledge, no work has systematically evaluated multiple measures of diculty and
looked for eects of each, controlling for the others.
In this section we empirically evaluate the prediction that ambiguity allows for re-use
of ecient linguistic units by looking at homophony, polysemy, and the ambiguity about
meaning of dierent syllables, in English, German, and Dutch. Our basic approach is to
measure properties of words and syllables which should inuence their ease of processing,
and see if easier linguistic units are preferentially re-used in language. We investigated the
inuence of three simple and easy-to-measure properties of words: length, frequency, and
phonotactic probability. Both frequency and length are known to inuence, for instance,
on-line language processing (e.g. Rayner, 1998; Demberg, 2010) with longer and lower-
frequency words taking longer to process. The phonotactic predictability measure uses
Markov model to quantify how phonetically probable a word is, given all other words in
the language. Intuitively, words that are re-used through ambiguity should be very high
probability in order to increase cognitive and articulatory ease. While we only examined
these three predictors, our theory predicts that any other measure which increases processing
ease should also increase ambiguity.
We use several dierent techniques to analyze the inuence of these factors on ambi-
guity. Ideally, one would measure ambiguity using the entropy over meanings for a given
linguistic form. Unfortunately, entropy is dicult to estimate without statistical bias (see
Paninski, 2003); in fact, the amount by which an entropy estimate is biased depends on
the sample size|in this case, token frequency|meaning that one might expect correlations
with frequency simply because of estimation error. This means that using entropy over
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meanings as an outcome measure leads to results which are dicult to interpret. For this
reason, we primarily present count data: for each linguistic unit, we count the number of
possible meanings it has in order to measure its degree of ambiguity. There exist sophis-
ticated regression techniques for counts, and the counts we use are hand-created, which
means they should not be inherently correlated with other measures like frequency. We
also present linear regression results using rank-ordered counts, a measure which makes
less assumptions about the distribution of counts. Finally, for comparison we also include
results using entropy measures over meanings, but caution that these are more dicult to
interpret. All these analysis methods give nearly identical qualitative results, meaning that
the ndings we present are robust to analysis method and how ambiguity is quantied.
We note that the three analysis methods are not statistically independent since the counts,
rank-ordered counts, and entropy are all correlated.
Homophony
Here, we examine homophones in CELEX (Baayen, Piepenbrock, & Gulikers, 1995)
and test the predictions of the previous section that phonological forms which are easier
should be more ambiguous. For instance, the phonological form for \we" has a single
homophone, \wee," since \we" and \wee" have dierent meanings but are pronounced the
same. Here, words with multiple parts of speech|\experiment" the verb and \experiment"
the noun|are also counted as homophones. Our prediction is that phonological forms
which are high-frequency (low negative log probability), phonotactically well-formed, and
short will map to many dierent word lemmas. We excluded words in CELEX containing
spaces, hyphens, or apostrophes, leaving 65,417 English phonological forms, 310,668 German
phonological forms, and 277,522 Dutch phonological forms. These mapped to a total of
77,243 English lemmas, 319,579 German lemmas, and 292,563 Dutch lemmas respectively.
Word length was measured by syllables, although measuring it by phonemes gives
similar results. Word frequencies were taken from CELEX, and were transformed to negative
log probabilities (unigram probabilities). We used add-one smoothing to prevent words from
having zero frequencies, though similar results are found by excluding the lowest frequency
words. To compute phonotactic surprisal, we used a simple triphone language model to
compute the surprisal (negative log probability) of each phonological form. We trained
the phonotactic language model using the word frequencies: for each phonological form
w, we removed all but one token count of w from the corpus, and trained a language
model on the remaining lexicon. This means the phonotactic model can be viewed as the
probability of a phonological form training on all other words, smoothed with one token
count of the current word. However, the results here are robust to the precise form of the
phonotactic language model as biphone and quadphone models gave nearly identical results.
The measure of phonotactic surprisal was divided by word length to prevent it from being
collinear with length, and can therefore be interpreted as surprisal per phoneme, averaged
over the entire word. With these covariates, multicollinearity was assessed by computing
a variance ination factor, which was below 2:0 in all languages, indicating a low-degree
of collinearity, despite correlations between length and frequency (e.g. Zipf, 1936). Indeed,
residualization of length on frequency gives identical qualitative results.
Figure 1 shows the mean number of homophones a given phonological form has. Each
phonological form maps to at least one word in CELEX, and this gure shows the num-
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Figure 1. : Number of additional meanings each a phonological form has, as a function of
length, negative log probability, and phonotactic surprisal. This shows predicted eects,
with shorter, lower negative log probability (higher frequency), and lower phonotactic sur-
prisal forms having more meanings. Note all y-axes are logarithmically spaced. Error bars
show standard errors within each bin.
ber of additional words mapped to each phonological form, for number of syllables, binned
log (base e) negative log probability, and binned phonotactic log probability, in the three
languages. This gure shows several clear patterns. First, Figure 1a shows that shorter
phonological forms are assigned more meanings. These patterns all hold across the three
languages examined here, indicating that ease seems to be a robust and cross-linguistic
predictor of how many meanings will be assigned to each phonological form. Figure 1b
also shows that lower negative log probability (higher frequency) phonological forms tend
to be mapped to many more word meanings than higher negative log probability (lower
frequency) phonological forms, across all languages. This is somewhat dicult to interpret
because phonological forms with more meanings should be seen more simply because they
can be used in more situations. However, that interpretation predicts a linear relationship
between number of meanings and frequency: all else being equal, a word with k mean-
ings should be used k times more than a word with 1 meaning. This gure demonstrates
a linear relationship between number of meanings and log frequency, corresponding to a
super-linear relationship between number of homophones and frequency. We therefore ar-
gue such a relationship likely results from the ease of processing more frequent wordforms,
rather than merely the fact that phonological forms with more meanings can be used in
more situations. Figure 1c shows that as average phonotactic surprisal per phoneme in-
creases, words also tend to have fewer meanings. This eect tends to level out, showing no
dierences between the highest surprisal words, or, in the case of Dutch slight increases with
the highest phonotactic surprisal words. These eects may result from poorer estimation
in the highest phonotactic surprisal words, which have the lowest frequency phonotactic
trigrams. In general, though, these plots show the predicted trends for the majority of
data, indicating that phonotactically easier|higher probability according to the rest of the
lexicon|phonological forms are assigned more meanings.
We performed several dierent types of regression analysis on this data. This allowed
us to test the statistical signicance of the trends in Figure 1 and evaluate the performance
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of each predictor while simultaneously controlling for eects of the other predictors. This
is especially important in the case of, for instance, frequency and length, since these two
variables are correlated and it is important to know that apparent eects of one variable do
not result from correlations with another. For all regression analyses, we used standardized
the covariates. We rst used a quasi-Poisson regression to predict the number of additional
meanings each phonological form in CELEX can map to (Gelman & Hill, 2006). This
regression revealed signicant eects of length, with longer phonological forms mapping to
fewer words in all languages ( >  0:85; t <  51:89; p < 0:001 in each language). Higher
negative log probability (lower frequency) words mapped to fewer meanings ( >  0:71; t >
53:3; p < 0:001 in each language). Second, words with higher phonotactic surprisal mapped
to fewer words in German and Dutch ( >  0:11; t <  6:59; p < 0:001), but the trend
was only marginally signicant in the wrong direction in English ( = 0:03; t = 2:01; p <
0:045). This eect is non-signicant if controlling for multiple comparisons. These results
demonstrate that the tends in Figure 1 are statistically signicant while controlling for other
variables, with the exception of the English phonotactic curve. Several interactions were
present, although they were generally of small magnitude and not of theoretical interest
here.
We additionally performed a regression predicting a phonological form's rank in terms
of number of meanings. Thus, the word with the most meanings was rank 1, the second most
meanings was rank 2, etc. This revealed nearly identical qualitative results: predicted eects
of longer words increasing rank ( > 2436; t > 55:77; p < 0:001 in each language), higher
negative log probability (lower frequency) increasing rank ( > 3175; t <  69:17; p < 0:001
in each language), and higher phonotactic surprisal increasing rank ( > 142; t > 3:2; p <
0:002 in each language). Finally, for comparison, we also included a regression predicting the
entropy over lemmas for each phonological form, as measured using maximum likelihood
entropy estimation with the CELEX frequency counts. As discussed above, entropy is
dicult to estimate, but the results here appear quite robust even with estimated entropies.
This regression revealed signicant, predicted eects: increasing length decreases entropy
( <  0:0098; t <  52:2; p < 0:001 in each language), higher negative log probability
(lower frequency) decreases entropy ( <  0:015; t > 63:3; p < 0:001 in each language),
and increasing phonotactic surprisal decreases entropy ( <  0:0019; t <  9:9; p < 0:001
in each language).
These regression analyses indicate that each factor that we predicted to increase ease
of use, also increases the number of meanings assigned to a phonological form. This nding
is robust to the way in which ambiguity is quantied.
Polysemy
Next, we consider similar predictions about the number of word senses each word has
as a function of the word's length. For this analysis, we looked at word forms found in the
English versions of WordNet (Fellbaum et al., 1998) and CELEX (Baayen et al., 1995). We
chose to look at part of speech categories separately to ensure that ndings are not driven
by a single part of speech category, and also to check that these eects go beyond eects
of homophony. For each word and part of speech, we computed the number of senses using
WordNet. Words such as \run" have many senses|while homophone sets only distinguish
substantially dierent meanings, word senses separate related meanings, such as those in
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Figure 2. : Number of word senses as a function of a word's length, negative log probability,
and phonotactic probability. This shows predicted eects, with shorter, higher frequency
(lower negative log probability), and lower phonotactic surprisal forms having more senses.
All y-axes are logarithmically spaced and error bars show standard errors within each bin.
\John runs to the store", \she runs her ngers through her hair", and \the train runs
between Boston and New York". For each word, CELEX was used to nd the phonological
length of each word, as well as its phonotactic probability and frequency (negative log
probability), using the same methods as the previous section. However, here we analyzed
the number of senses assigned to each word lemma without collapsing by phonological
form. This resulted in 20,582 nouns, 3175 verbs, and 1,536 adjectives, with 41,206, 10,358,
and 3,770 total senses respectively. Multicollinearity was assessed by computing a variance
ination factor, which was below 1:84 in all languages, indicating a low-degree of collinearity;
residualization of length on frequency yielded identical qualitative results.
Figure 2 shows predicted eects in each part of speech, and for each measure. This
reveals the predicted trends in nearly the full range of all measures. Note that the lower
negative log probability noun bins that do not match the qualitative patterns each contain
only one word. For the majority of bins across the range of variables, factors which should
increase ease also increase the number of word senses. The frequency results here can be
compared to Zipf (1949, p27-30), who previously found that more frequent words have more
meanings using a dictionary. He found a linear relationship with a slope close to  0:5,
the theoretical slope according to his law of meaning distribution. Zipf presented these
results as evidence for opposing forces of unication and diversication, which provided the
basis for his explanation of ambiguity. The results here are similar, but with a dierent
theoretical basis. We argue that frequent words|like phonotactically well-formed and short
words|have more meanings because they are easier to process. In contrast, Zipf argued
that frequent words have more meanings because such a relationship optimally balances
concerns of speakers and listeners.
As with homophony above, our primary regression technique was a Poisson regression
predicting the additional number of senses a word has, from each of the predictors. As above,
this regression revealed longer words have fewer senses ( <  :15; t <  4:1; p < 0:001 for
each part of speech category), higher negative log probability (lower frequency) words have
fewer senses ( <  0:47; t > 23:6; p < 0:001 for each part of speech category), and higher
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phonotactic surprisal have fewer senses ( <  :15; t <  3:95; p < 0:001 for each part of
speech category). As above, a linear regression on rank number of senses revealed identical
qualitative patterns. A regression on entropy was not performed because enough data on
the frequency of various word senses was not available; however, given the results in the
previous section, it is likely that these results would generalized to entropy-based ambiguity
measures.
This nding replicates our results showing the relationship between processing di-
culty and ambiguity using an alternative measure of ambiguity in English (the number of
senses for each word). It also shows that the eect is not limited to homophones that dier
in part-of-speech category.
Syllables
The previous two sections tested length-ambiguity relationships on two dierent anal-
yses at the word level: homophony and polysemy. In this section we extend the analyses
of the previous sections to the syllable level. Our prediction for syllables is identical: easier
syllables should convey less information about meaning than harder syllables. In this case,
we take syllables to be informative about the words that they appear in. Given just one
syllable, one will have some incomplete information about what word the speaker is at-
tempting to communicate. In this sense, individual syllables are ambiguous about meaning,
and it is only when they are heard in the context of other syllables, words, and discourse
situations that they can be used to unambiguously communicate meaning.
We analyzed syllables in words from CELEX. In each language we computed the
number of words each syllable appears in. Syllable frequencies and phonotactic log proba-
bilities were computed using the same procedure as the previous two sections. The length
of each syllable was measured as the number of phones in its phonological transcription. We
computed phonotactic log probability using a trigram model, and computed the negative
log probability of each syllable according to its total token count in CELEX. This resulted
in a total of 11,243, 10,816, and 11,979 syllable types in English, German and Dutch re-
spectively. Here, we take syllables to be informative about the word they appear in: each
syllable conveys information about the word the speaker is intending to say.
The relationship between the three \ease" measures and number of words a syllable
appears in is shown in Figure 3. As in the previous sections, we subtracted one from each
of these counts since each syllable must appear in at least one word to be in the sample.
This shows that syllables pattern similarly to words, except in the case of phonotactic pre-
dictability. The syllables with lowest phonotactic surprisal do appear in the most words;
however, very high phonotactic surprisal syllables also tend to appear in many words. This
quadratic trend is signicant using a quadratic term in a quasi-Poisson regression, for En-
glish and Dutch (p < 0:001), but not German (p = 0:52). We believe this trend is an
artifact of our phonotactic surprisal model, which has increased estimation error for the
high phonotactic surprisal (low phonotactic probability) phones. This interpretation is sup-
ported by the absence of a quadratic trend using a two-phone model (p > 0:25 for each
language). Alternatively, it may be the case that other articulatory eects (e.g. the Oblig-
atory Contour Principle: Frisch, Broe, & Pierrehumbert, n.d.; McCarthy, 1985, 1986; Gra
& Jaeger, 2009) are present at the syllable level and that this trend results from other kinds
of articulatory constraints.
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Figure 3. : Number of words a syllable appears in, as a function of the syllable's length,
negative log probability, and phonotactic surprisal. This shows predicted eects of length
and negative log probability, with a more complex pattern in phonotactic surprisal. All
y-axes are logarithmically spaced and error bars show standard errors within each bin.
A quasi-Poisson regression shows all eects in the predicted direction for En-
glish and Dutch: increasing length decreases the number of words a syllable appears
in ( <  0:07; t <  2:6; p < 0:01 in each language), higher negative log probability
(lower frequency) decreases the number of words ( <  1:38; t > 65:3; p < 0:001 in each
language), and increasing phonotactic surprisal tends to decrease the number of words
( <  0:18; t <  4:6; p < 0:001 in each language). In German, eects of frequency
( =  1:74; t =  60; p < 0:001) and phonotactic surprisal ( =  :16; t =  2:88; p < 0:01)
were signicant in the predicted directions; length, however, was signicant in a non-
predicted direction ( = 0:21; t = 4:83; p < 0:001). Multicollinearity was assessed by
computing a variance ination factor, which was below 3:2 in all languages, indicating a
low-degree of collinearity. However, residualization of length on frequency yielded the pre-
dicted eects, reverse eects, and null eects in English, German, and Dutch respectively.
This indicates that the observed eects of length are only independent of frequency in
English, and that length eects might not be present in all languages.
Regressions predicting rank-order number of words a syllable appears in yielded pat-
terns identical to the quasi-Poisson regression; regressions predicting entropy yielded a null
result for German syllable length (rather than a signicant result the wrong way) and
predicted directions for all other languages and variables.
In general, these results indicate that generally the predictors of ease extend to syllable
units, although not in the case of German syllable length. As discussed above, it is likely
that at the syllable level, other kinds of constraints such as articulation exert a stronger
inuence on the design of lexical systems. In general, this syllable analysis is interesting
in part because syllables are not generally taken to be ambiguous in the same way that
words or sentences are. Syllables are not, on their own, meaningful units of language,
and therefore it may seem strange to describe them as ambiguous. However syllables are
informative about intended meanings. In this case, we take the intended meaning to be the
word lemma which being communicated, the same unit of meaning used in the homophony
analysis. The results show that syllables are dierentially informative about this intended
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meaning, and that the same factors which inuence processing ease on a word-level are also
seen at the sub-word, or indeed sub-meaning, level of syllables.
General Discussion
We have presented two related arguments that show a well-designed communication
system will be ambiguous, when examined out of context. We tested predictions of this
theory, showing that words which are more ecient are preferentially re-used in language
through ambiguity, allowing for greater ease overall. Our regression on homophones, polyse-
mous words, and syllables|though similar|are theoretically and statistically independent.
We therefore interpret positive results in each as strong evidence for the view that ambiguity
exists for reasons of communicative eciency. We note, however, that the languages tested
are historically-related, meaning that further work will be needed to establish stronger
typological generalizations.
Our analyses used regressions, which means that coecients can be interpreted as
the eect of one covariate, while controlling for others. This is important because if one
nds a relationship between, say, ambiguity and length, it is important to show that this
apparent eect is not due to correlations between ambiguity and frequency, and frequency
and length. We generally found large, independent eects, statistically-signicant eects
of phonotactic probability, length, and frequency. This provides strong evidence that these
factors each inuence degree of ambiguity, even while controlling for the other factors. This
veries a prediction of the minimal-eort explanation for ambiguity: every factor we tested
which we predicted to increase ease of processing, also increased ambiguity.
This is not to say that there is no cost to ambiguity. First, comprehenders must ac-
tively use context to disambiguate meaning. However, considerable evidence from language
processing indicates that comprehenders are able to quickly use contextual information in
the form of discourse context (Altmann & Steedman, 1988; Altmann, Garnham, & Den-
nis, 1992; Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995; Spivey & Tanenhaus,
1998; Kaiser & Trueswell, 2004; Grodner, Gibson, & Watson, 2005), local linguistic context
(Frazier, 1979; Jurafsky, 1996; Gibson, 1998; McDonald & Shillcock, 2003; Frisson, Rayner,
& Pickering, 2005; Levy, 2008), or more global world knowledge (Trueswell, Tanenhaus,
& Garnsey, 1994; Altmann & Kamide, 1999; Kamide, Altmann, & Haywood, 2003) in
disambiguating language. These systems may be just as useful for normal language com-
prehension, as they are for disambiguating the types of ambiguity discussed in this paper.
Comprehenders continually make inferences about what speakers are intending to convey
(Grice, 1969; Crain & Steedman, 1985; Sedivy, Tanenhaus, Chambers, & Carlson, 1999;
Levinson, 2000; Sedivy, 2002), both and what their utterances may mean on literal and
pragmatic levels. In fact, Levinson (2000) has argued explicitly that speaker articulation,
not hearer inference, is the principal bottleneck in human language. Inference is \cognitively
cheap": therefore, normal human communication requires the comprehender to make con-
tinual inferences about speaker intention, and does not require the speaker to fully articulate
every shade of meaning and resolve every ambiguity.
A more substantial cost for ambiguity arises when inference fails, causing actual
confusion. Wasow et al. (2005) list several real world ambiguities causing communicative
problems, although they point out they have no way of estimating the frequency with which
such situations arise. However, other researchers have claimed that they are vanishingly
COMMUNICATIVE FUNCTION OF AMBIGUITY 17
rare. Miller (1951) even argued that language only appears ambiguous when we try to
examine words out of their normal usage context. Considering the many senses of the word
\take," he wrote \Why do people tolerate such ambiguity? The answer is that they don't.
There is nothing ambiguous about 'take' as it is used in everyday speech. The ambiguity
appears only when we, quite arbitrarily, call isolated words the unit of meaning." Indeed,
polysemy and homophony appear to be so well-disambiguated by context that we often
consciously notice genuine ambiguity as humorous4. Nearly all frequent words have multiple
senses but word senses can be disambiguated reasonably well by computational models
(Navigli, 2009), even using very simple knowledge of context or heuristics (Gale, Church, &
Yarowsky, 1992; Yarowsky, 1993). Similarly, structural ambiguities that slow down human
comprehension are extremely rare (Wasow & Arnold, 2003; Jaeger, 2006; Ferreira, 2008;
Jaeger, 2010). Therefore, we believe that the potential for miscommunication is rare enough
relative to the degree of ambiguity that it is reasonable ignore this communicative cost, at
least as an approximation.
Language users do not appear to go to great lengths to avoid linguistic ambiguities,
despite actively avoiding conceptual ambiguities. Ferreira, Slevc, and Rogers (2005) found
that experimental participants chose to produce descriptions of objects that avoided con-
ceptual ambiguities, such as saying \small bat" rather than just \bat" when a large bat was
also present. However, speakers much less often went to similar lengths to avoid purely lin-
guistic ambiguities (such as \baseball bat" when an animal bat was also present). Similarly,
when choosing between dierent syntactic expressions of an intended meaning (such as the
whether to omit the \who were" in \the astronauts who were selected...", which would
lead to a temporary ambiguity) speakers seem to produce the fuller or clearer expressions
no more often or only slightly more often when there is the potential for ambiguity (e.g.
Allbritton, McKoon, & Ratcli, 1996; Arnold, Wasow, Asudeh, & Alrenga, 2004; Ferreira
& Dell, 2000; Haywood, Pickering, & Branigan, 2005). These ndings suggest that ambi-
guity is not enough of a problem to real-world communication that speakers would make
much eort to avoid it. This may well be because actual language in context provides
other information that resolves the ambiguities most of the time. Such information could
be prosodic (e.g. Mims & Trueswell, 1999; Snedeker & Trueswell, 2003; Kraljic & Brennan,
2005) (though see Allbritton et al., 1996), or it may be given by context, meaning that in
real language use there is rarely much need to actively choose linguistic forms which are
unambiguous in isolation (e.g. Ferreira & Dell, 2000; Haywood et al., 2005; Ferreira, 2008).
Our arguments are closely related to Uniform Information Density (UID: see Jaeger
(2010)), which holds that speakers are more likely to choose words and structures which
maintain a roughly constant rate of information transmission. UID and closely related the-
ories have been used to explain phenomena such as discourse-level predictability (Genzel
& Charniak, 2002, 2003; Piantadosi & Gibson, 2008; Qian & Jaeger, submitted), syntac-
tic choice (Jaeger, 2006; Levy & Jaeger, 2007; Jaeger, 2010) and reduction (Van Son &
Pols, 2003; Aylett & Turk, 2004; Frank & Jaeger, 2008). An ambiguous linguistic form
conveys less information about its intended meaning than an unambiguous linguistic form.
Therefore, to keep the entropy rate constant, one might choose ambiguous linguistic units
which are less surprising in other ways which match our ndings: UID predicts that am-
4Whether or not it is intended as such, as in the headline \Chimpanzee Training Expert to Lecture."
COMMUNICATIVE FUNCTION OF AMBIGUITY 18
biguous words will be more phonotactically predictable, higher-frequency (less surprising),
and shorter (to maintain constant information-per-time). However, we argue that the re-
sults presented above are not merely a consequence of UID, though they rely on similar
ideas and theoretical basis. Most importantly, UID does not directly predict that ecient
language should be ambiguous. One could easily design a linguistic communication system
in which more informative, or surprising words were shorter, without necessarily making
any words ambiguous about, say, their intended sense. Analogously in coding theory, one
can construct codes such as Human codes for which the length of each code word depends
on its log probability, but the code words can map unambiguously to meanings. Addition-
ally, if language is rarely ambiguous in context, it is not clear that UID makes predictions
about the out-of-context measures of ambiguity studied here, since UID is a theory of in-
context language use. That is, the information rate for an ideal observer does not depend on
contextually-unsupported interpretations, since an ideal observer eliminates them. As such,
ideal-observer models of UID do not make predictions about ambiguity, but less rational
characterizations which consider contextually-unsupported meanings may.
Conclusion
We have provided several kinds of evidence for the view that ambiguity results from
a pressure for ecient communication. We argued that any ecient communication system
will necessarily be ambiguous when context is informative about meaning. The units of
an ecient communication system will not redundantly specify information provided by
the context; when examined out of context, these units will appear not to completely
disambiguate meaning. We have also argued that ambiguity allows ecient linguistic units
to be preferentially re-used, decreasing the overall eort needed to use a linguistic system.
We tested predictions of this theory by showing that ambiguity allows re-use of the
easiest linguistic units. These results are hard to explain with anything other than a theory
based on ecient communication: what theory would posit that ambiguity should preferen-
tially be found in these linguistic units, but not that it results from pressure for eciency?
Our results argue for a rational explanation of ambiguity and demonstrate that ambiguity
is not mysterious when language is considered as a cognitive system designed in part for
communication.
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